Plant Species Protection Contracts: Modelling Contract Choice for Specialised Dairy Farms and Mixed Dairy Pig Fattening Farms in the Netherlands by Peerlings, Jack H.M. & Polman, Nico B.P.
Plant species protection contracts: modelling contract choice for specialised 






Jack Peerlings and Nico Polman 
Wageningen University, Agricultural Economics and Rural Policy Group 









Paper prepared for presentation at the XIth Congress of the EAAE 
(European Association of Agricultural Economists),  








“This document presents results obtained within the EU project SSPE-CT-2003-502070 on Integrated Tools to 
design and implement Agro Environmental Schemes (http//:merlin.lusignan.inra.fr/ITAES). It does not 
necessary reflect the view of the European Union and in no way anticipates on the commission’s future policy in 









Copyright 2005 by Peerlings and Polman.  All rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim copies of this 
document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such 
copies. 
 
  1Abstract 
Proposals of the European Commission stress the future importance of agri-environmental payments 
within the rural development policy of the European Union. The aim of this paper is to present and 
discuss a model for choice for plant species protection contracts in the Netherlands. The model 
includes transaction costs, time and the possibility of lock-in situations related to contract choice. The 
approach discussed is flexible because it makes it possible to introduce all kinds of technical and 
institutional restrictions (differences in contract design).  
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Proposals of the European Commission stress the future importance of agri-environmental 
payments within the rural development policy of the European Union (EC, 2004a). The new policy 
will replace EC 1257/99 by new support schemes (EC, 2004b). The proposed reform is aced around 
three major policy objectives: (1) increasing the competitiveness of the agricultural and forestry 
sector; (2) enhancing the environment and countryside and (3) enhancing the quality of life in rural 
areas. A total EU funding € 13 billion per year is proposed for the regulation period 2007-2013. Agri-
environmental schemes become part of axis 2 (EC, 2004a)1. Activities under axis 2 contribute to 
sustainable rural development by encouraging the main actors (farmers, foresters) to keep up land 
management in view of preserving and enhancing the natural space and landscape, of protecting and 
improving the environmental resources and of ensuring the sustainability of use of forestry resources. 
The policy is meant to reinforce rural development policy and to simplify its implementation. 
Policy makers aiming at improving wildlife and landscape have an interest in the reasons why 
farms choose a specific wildlife and landscape services contract (agri-environmental scheme) in order 
to design optimal contracts. Several studies apply principal-agent theory to analyse the design of agri-
environmental schemes focussing on hidden information and hidden actions (e.g. Ozanne et al., 2001 
and White, 2002). Other studies focus on the characteristics of farms and farmers that conclude agri-
environmental contracts of uniform design, e.g. Crabtree et al. (1998); Beedel (2000); Wenum (2002); 
and Wynn et al. (2001). Few studies concentrate on the actual modelling of contract choice as a 
decision related to other farming activities. Van Huylenbroeck et al. (2000) developed a simulation 
model to evaluate the impact of agri-environmental programmes on production, management and 
economic results of dairy farms. However, they do not take into account elements relevant for contract 
design like contract duration and private transaction costs (costs of negotiation, contracting and 
control). Peerlings and Polman (2004) use a micro econometric model to model wildlife and landscape 
contract choice. In their study they take into account transaction costs involved in contract choice but 
they ignore the elements of time or contract duration and lock-in situations in case of contract renewal. 
The latter are relevant given that most contracts have to be concluded for a limited number of years. 
Standard for agri-environmental schemes in the Netherlands is six years. This makes e.g. that under 
changing conditions a selected contract still has to be fulfilled although it could be not profitable 
anymore or other contracts would result in higher profits. This means that farms are locked-in in 
producing wildlife and landscape services due to contract terms or specific investments.  
In the Netherlands, about six agri-environmental schemes focus on the protection of plant species 
on grassland and apply to whole fields (botanical agreements). These contracts prescribe a number of 
different plant species at the start and or the end of the contracting period. Other prescriptions within 
the agreements are related to grazing and the use of fertilisers and manure. Kleijn et al. (2004) argue 
that factors not addressed in the contracts like groundwater levels and regional sewage patterns, in 
other words grassland quality, may have an overriding influence on the number plant species. 
Therefore there may be a strong effect of grassland quality on the decision of farms whether or not to 
conclude a plant species protection contract.  
                                                           
1 Axis 1: competitiveness and Axis 3 the wider rural economy 
  2  3
The aim of this paper is to present and discuss a model for choosing between different agri-
environmental schemes (AES) focussing on the protection of plant species. The model includes 
transaction costs, time and the possibility of lock-in situations. The model is applied for the choice of 
individual Dutch farms whether or not to select a plant species protection contract. Data is used from a 
mail survey (December 2004) among dairy farms in the Achterhoek. The Achterhoek is a region in the 
eastern part of the Netherlands and is characterised by sand soils. Sand, clay and peat soils cover about 
50, 40 and 10% of the Netherlands, respectively (Schröder et al., 2005: 5). More than half of the 
specialised dairy farms in the Netherlands are located on sandy soil where environmental problems are 
highest (Berentsen, 2003: 186). The dairy farms in the Achterhoek are representative for these dairy 
farms.   
We start with a discussion of the theoretical model in section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical 
model and data. Section 5 presents and discusses the results of simulations that highlight the role of 








This section presents a theoretical model of contract choice. Farms will choose to contract or to 
renew a contract if the expected gains from doing so are greater than those of organising the 
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Pare profits under contract i and j respectively and determined assuming profit 
maximisation on farm level. The basic idea is to see alternative contracts as sets of different 
technologies and transaction costs. Farms pick out that set or contract that gives the highest expected 
farm profit. Technology is interpreted here as different sets of technical and institutional restrictions. 
The institutional restrictions follow from the prescriptions in the contract, e.g. a reduction in stocking 
densities, the cessation of fertiliser input or the presences of a number of bird species per hectare.  
 
 
3.2  Static model with transaction costs 
 
Suppose farm h maximises profit given a specific technology. Where profit is defined as the difference 
between revenue of selling outputs (possibly including wildlife and landscape services) and costs of 
variable inputs (e.g. feed). We assume input and output prices equal between farms although this is not 
necessary. The price received for wildlife and landscape services is assumed to be contract dependent. 
The farm is confronted with transaction costs (see for example Falconer et al., 2001 or Van 
Huylenbroeck et al., 2004). First, there are variable transaction costs that are linked to the production 
level of wildlife and landscape services (e.g. monitoring). Second, there are fixed transaction costs that 
are linked to a specific contract choice (e.g. zero if farms do not consider contracting and stay in the 
initial situation). Examples of fixed transactions costs are search costs and costs to conclude a specific 
contract. It is assumed here that transaction costs are farm and contract specific. Profit for each 
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where:  hc π profit for farm h using contract c; p vector of prices of outputs,  hc y vector of  outputs for 
farm h using contract c, 
n
c p  price of wildlife and landscape services using contract c, 
n
hc y  production of 
wildlife and landscape services production using contract c, 
hc x vector of variable inputs for farm h 
using contract c, w vector of prices of variable inputs,  hc t  variable fixed transaction costs for farm h 
using contract c;  hc TC  fixed transaction costs for farm h using contract c,  h z vector of quasi-fixed 
inputs (or outputs) for farm h,  hc T  technology set for farm h using contract c. 
 
In this static model each contract implies a different technology set, transaction costs and price of 
wildlife and landscape services. Not choosing a specific contract is of course also an option. The farm 
just picks out the contract that gives the highest profit. Notice that the variable transaction costs will 
influence the marginal costs, and therefore, the production level of wildlife and landscape services. 
They reduce the price received for wildlife and landscape services. The fixed transaction costs do not 
influence marginal costs but do influence the decision whether or not to produce wildlife and 
landscape services under a specific contract because they directly affect profit levels. 
 
Lock-in situations can be described with this model when the farm picked out a contract in period 
1 and faces the decision to conclude the contract again in period 2.  If conditions are less favourable it 
could be that because extra costs are involved, e.g. grassland renewal, the contract will be concluded 
again, although, without these extra costs this would not have happened. 
 
 
4  Empirical model and data 
 
The model of Section 3 is applied in this section for the choice of individual Dutch farms whether 




4.1 Empirical  model 
 
The theoretical model requires calculation of profits for different contracts. This can be done using a 
linear programming model. Advantage of this type of model is that not a complete data set of an 
individual farm and contract is needed if it is assumed that variables omitted are not restrictive or 
already optimally applied. Moreover, it is relatively easy to formulate technical and institutional 
restrictions explicitly.   
Suppose we have a specialised dairy farm or mixed dairy pig fattening farm that faces the choice 
whether or not to conclude a plant species protection contract and if a contract is concluded for how 
many hectares. We assume the number of pigs fixed and that all the pig feed is bought. This is the 
common situation in the Netherlands where pig feed (concentrates) is bought from the specialised 
compound feed industry. The farm has given its milk quota and dairy cattle stock a certain fixed feed 
requirement. It is assumed that farms can either buy this feed or produce it on farm. If less feed is 
produced than it can buy feed (e.g. concentrates) at a fixed price. Total feed production on the farm is 
determined by the feed production per hectare. If the farm concludes a plant species protection 
contract the feed production per hectare will be reduced given the constraints put on e.g. mowing 
grass. We assume there are three types of grassland, there is good quality grassland (i=1), medium 
quality grassland (i=2) and bad quality grassland (i=3). These types of land can have a different 
maximum feed production per hectare. Farms also grow fodder maize on their land. Another effect of 
concluding a plant species protection contract is that no manure can be applied on land. This can lead 
to an extra surplus of nitrogen from manure that has to be exported off-farm as a result of Dutch   5
manure policies. This increases costs and makes concluding a plant species protection contract less 
attractive.  
These assumptions are in line with Dupraz et al. (2003). According to Dupraz, et al. (2003) 
production potential and livestock density of the farm have a negative influence on the participation 
probability, while the share of low productivity meadows on the farms has a positive influence. Wynn 
et al. (2001) also find that farms with more productive land have fewer opportunities to enter a scheme 
and face higher opportunity costs from entry, at least for some elements of agri-environmental 
measures.  
If the contract is concluded the farm receives a fixed price per hectare contracted. The farm 
maximises the differences between revenue from wildlife and landscape services production minus the 
costs of feed bought and nitrogen disposal costs by determining the optimal number of hectares of the 
three types of land contracted, the amount of feed bought and the amount of manure disposal. A higher 
price of wildlife and landscape services, a lower price of feed and lower costs of nitrogen disposal per 
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where:  π  profit, n p price of wildlife and landscape services per hectare contracted,  f w  price of 
bought feed,  f x  bought feed,  s w costs of nitrogen removal,  s x nitrogen surplus of manure,  s w price of  
fertiliser, c x  fertiliser use, feed total feed required,  n fz feed production per hectare with wildlife and 
landscape services production, 
i
r fz feed production per hectare without wildlife and landscape services 
production on land type i (= regular land-use) ,  m fz feed production per hectare with maize, 
i z total 
availability of land type i, 
i
r z land of type i without wildlife and landscape services, 
i
n z land of type i 
with wildlife and landscape services production,  m z land with fodder maize, N net nitrogen production from animal manure2,   nitrogen application via manure per hectare without wildlife and landscape 
services production ,  nitrogen application via manure per hectare with wildlife and landscape 




i fert   fertiliser use 
per hectare of land type i. 
Nitrogen production depends mainly on the number of animals and production level. It is 
assumed fixed per farm. In the model it is further assumed that the technology does not change when a 
farm concludes a plant species protection contract. Feed production can differ between different types 
of land and is dependent on the level nitrogen applied (see Appendix 1 for a detailed description. 
There are no non-negativity constraints for bought feed and nitrogen surplus because farms can decide 
to sell feed produced and use nitrogen from other farms. It is assumed that farms use the maximum 
amount of 250 kg N from animal manure per hectare., N  fertiliser use is less or equal than 148 kg 





A survey was used to get information about the relevant variables. The used sampling strategy 
was a random sampling among all the farms in the Acherhoek a region in the eastern part of the 
Netherlands (four municipalities: Aalten, Berkelland, Groenlo en Winterswijk). The population 
density is about 293 inhabitants/km
2 and the area is about 604 km². It is a small scale landscape with 
tree rows aside the roads; it has forests, several brooks (north and south, streaming from east to north- 
and southwest), and many pastures. The main farm activity is dairy farming (on average about two-
thirds of the farms). Nitrogen and phosphate concentrations in groundwater are rather high in this area. 
The sample consists of 1380 farms. A questionnaire was developed and pre-tested by experts in 
the field of farming and agri-environmental schemes and by individual farmers. After pre-testing the 
questionnaire was adapted. After about three weeks, all farmers to whom a questionnaire was sent 
received a reminder letter. In total 333 of 1380 farmers sent back the filled-in questionnaire; a 
response rate of almost 25 per cent. This percentage is reasonable given the methodology of the 
questionnaire.  
First a set of questions were asked to clarify the farm type (crop and animal activities) and 
location of the farm. A second set of questions ask about the farm’s labour input. A third group of 
questions concerns production issues, grazing and grassland types. Fourth, questions are asked about 
the (land) ownership structure of the farm. Fifth, questions are asked about multifunctional farming 
activities including wildlife and landscape management. Finally, a number of questions are asked 
about the age structure of the farm household, their education level, time allocation, continuation of 
the farm (succession) and the farmer’s trust in the government.  
Table 1 gives an overview of a number of relevant characteristics of farms in the sample. This 
study concentrates on very specialized dairy farming and mixed dairy pig fattening farms of which 
151 farms were in the sample. Farmers ranked their grassland into good, medium and bad quality 
grassland. This means that we did not measure differences in grassland quality but we asked farmer for 
subjective judgements. Farmers were asked to base their ranking on the following two criteria: (1) the 
suitability of grassland for grazing; and (2) the contribution of grassland to roughage production. Most 
farmers have high productivity land (146 out of 151) and a minority has low productive land (52 out 
of 151). About 24% of the farmers judged that they only have good or medium quality grassland.  
                                                           
2 Net means total nitrogen production corrected for losses via ammonia emissions from stable and storage.  
 
  6The use of several quality categories by farmers shows in the first place that they do not consider 
farmland to be homogenous. 
 
Table 1. Sample characteristics specialised dairy farms and mixed dairy pig fattening farms, 2004 
           Average  Standard deviation 
Number of farms  151   
  Specialised dairy   125   
  Mixed dairy/pig fattening  26   
Farm size (ha)       
  Good grassland  20.2   9.1 
  Moderate grassland  4.3   4.6 
  Bad grassland  1.2   2.2 
 Maize  9.6    5.3 
  Plant species protection contracts 
(mainly on grassland) 
1.5      5.3   
Milk production (kg)    515945      215010 
Number of dairy cows  65  24 
Number of pigs  803  927 
Price milk (€)  0.32     0.01 
Nitrogen production (kg N per farm)  9002      3538  
Total feed required (NEL3)   3972484  262406 
Percentage of farmers grazing dairy cattle  15%   
Farms with plant species protection contracts (%)  22%   
Farms with landscape management contracts (%)  17%   





Source: Farm survey 
 
 
Farms-size and milk production are comparable to the average farm size in the Netherlands. The 
average number of cows is about 65 and this is larger than for the Dutch average dairy farm. However, 
the farms in the set are specialized dairy farms. Total N production per farm is calculated using 
technical data on the relation between the milk production per cow and nitrogen excretion per cow 
(see Hoop, 2004). Milk production per cow is derived from the questionnaire. About 27% of all farms 
conclude wildlife and landscape services contracts. About 28% of the farms is member of an 
environmental co-operative. These co-operatives are groups of farms co-operating with the aim of 
preserving wildlife and landscape and combining this activity with farming. 
Dry matter yield for grassland management with restrictions will be in the range of about 4 to 12 
to ton/ha/year
 depending on manure application and the delay of the first cut of grass (following 
Dijkstra, 1991 and Geerts and Korevaar, 2004). In addition, a lower digestibility (caused by an agri-
environmental scheme) causes a lower intake of grass and roughage. This means, in combination with 
the lower energy value (less manure), a smaller energy intake, which lead to lower animal production 
and/or the needs for extra supplementary feeding with for instance concentrates (Korevaar, 1986). 
Berentsen en Giesen (1995: 160) argue that energy production mainly depends on soil type, on the 
ground water table and the level of N use. These factors were addressed in the questionnaire. The 
judgements of farmers were analysed by asking to farmers to what extend a number of external 
circumstances relevant for grassland quality apply on the distinction between good, medium and bad 
quality. Table 2 shows the characterisation of good, medium and bad quality grassland. 
 
                                                           
3 The energy requirement is defined as the required  Net Energy for Lactation (NEL; see Ven (1992: 24-25) for 
the definition of NEL) 
  7Table 2. Grassland quality differences (number of observations is 151), 2004 
Share of land (percentage) 
Production level  















Good    146  85  15 93 90  90 
Medium   106  26  70 74 44  36 
Bad   52  6  60 59 36  25 
Source: Farm survey 
 
 
The answers on productivity levels for good, medium and bad quality grassland correspond to the 
question to rank their grassland. Sandy soils are considered to be better soils for grassland compared to 
other soil types present in this region. The judgement of grassland quality is in line with the soil 
quality. The ground water level and water drainage are satisfactory for most good grassland and less 
satisfactory for medium and bad quality grassland. The subjective estimates of farmers on dry matter 
yields are used as maximum dry matter production of grassland in the model.  
Farms have two options to react on the restrictions due to the measures in the agri-environmental 
contract: producing less milk and buying concentrates in order to compensate for the loss of the feed 
content of roughage. The first option is not very realistic in the Netherlands given the high 
profitability of producing milk. The loss of feed content and the concentrates to be bought are both 
measured in NEL.  
The actual application per hectare of fertilisers is asked in the questionnaire for good, medium 
and bad quality grassland. Manure application on grassland is also asked. For manure we use a 
working coefficient (z) that indicates that 1/z kg N in manure is necessary to replace 1 kg N in  
fertiliser for the same yield (following Buysse et al., 2005). Working coefficients are taken from de 
Hoop et al. (2004: 21) and only dependent on manure type. For fertilisers the working coefficient is 
100%. For grazing dairy cattle the working coefficient in 2009 is set at 45%. If the dairy cows that are 
not grazing and fatting pigs the norm for manure is 60%. Figure 1 shows the calculation of nitrogen 
surpluses on farm level.  
 
 
Figure 1. Calculation of nitrogen surplus on mixed dairy/fattening pig farms 
Ammonia emission 
from stable and 
storage 




   
Manure application dairy cattle and 
fattening pigs possible up to maximum 







Surplus per ha if 
application is higher 
than application norm 
  8The application of manure is restricted by a maximum of 250 kg N per ha. Establishing a limit on 
N supply in animal manures while ignoring mineral N-inputs is not justified, as one substitutes the 
other and not only with respect to crop nutrition, but also to N-losses to the environment (Berge et al., 
2002: 237). The stable and storage ammonia emission are dependent on the type stable and whether 
cows are grazing or non-grazing. The maximum application of nitrogen from both manure and 
fertilisers is restricted by of the new Dutch manure policy starting in 2006. The maximum allowed 
application is dependent on soil type and crop type.  
The application of manure and fertilisers give the total N-application of farm level. Higher 
grassland production implies the application of more N/ha on grassland. This has also consequences 
for the nitrogen balance on farm level. Moreover, different application standards apply for land used 
for plants species protection contracts and land not used for plant species protection (Geerts and 
Korevaar, 2004). In the simulations we will assume no N can be applied. For maize only one nutrient 
rate is used because production response to nutrients is low (e.g. Berentsen et al., 2000: 128). 
 
 




Using the model and data described in Section 4 we now determine the optimal contract choice 
for the 151 selected farms under different scenarios. In the base scenario (S0) the data apply as 
described in Section 4.2. A contract is concluded for a period of 5 years. It is assumed that farms are 
confronted with both fixed and variable transaction costs. It is assumed that fixed transaction costs 
only apply for the first year the contract is concluded (€175). The discount rate is assumed to be 5%. 
Moreover, variable transaction costs are assumed to be 22.5% of the compensation paid to farms. The 
price of bought feed (concentrates and roughage) and the compensation per hectare contracted are 
assumed equal between farms and value 0.034 €/kg NEL and 975 €/ha respectively. To examine the 
effect of transaction costs, changing manure policies and lock-in on contract choice we define four 
additional scenarios. 
 
S1: Transaction costs 
S1 analyses the effects of an increase of variable transaction costs e.g. because of more strict 
requirements in the plant species protection contract. The variable transaction costs are increased from 
22.5 to 45%4. This decreases the compensation for contracted land. It is to be expected that a decrease 
in compensation lowers the number of hectares of land contracted. This effect could be partially offset 
by a decrease in N disposal costs and a decrease in feed costs. 
 
S2: Manure policies 
We calculate here the effects of a change in manure policies. Instead of an application standard of 250 
kg N from animal manure per hectare for regularly used grassland, 150 kg N from animal manure per 
hectare of fodder maize and 0 kg N per hectare of land contracted we assume the application standard 
for grassland becomes 170 kg N per hectare from animal manure. The 250 kg N per hectare is the 
present norm for 2009, 170 kg N per hectare is the norm if the Dutch derogation request for 250 kg N 
per hectare would be rejected. The total amount of N from  fertiliser remains 148 kg N or less in both 
cases. More strict manure policies could decrease the amount of land contracted because less N can be 
put on contracted land. 
 
S3: Feed prices 
We calculate here the effects of a 25% increase in feed prices. Higher feed prices make it more 
attractive to produce feed on the farm. Given that land contracted produces less feed this makes 
concluding a plant species protection contract less attractive. Higher feed prices could follow from 
                                                           
4 Sensitivity analyses show that although fixed transaction costs do influence profit they do not influence contract choice in 
any of the scenarios defined. 
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reduced N use, and therefore, smaller feed production coming from more strict manure policies in the 
Netherlands. 
 
S4: Lock-in  
In this scenario we illustrate the possibility of lock-in. Suppose farms conclude a contract for 
a five year period. After this five year period they are confronted with a 50% reduction in the 
compensation paid in the plant species protection contract. This makes concluding a new 
contract less attractive. However, assume that not concluding the contract involves an extra 
investment because of grassland renewal. We assume here that farms are not aware of the 
reduction in compensation paid in period 2. Therefore, they do not take the possibility of 





Table 3. Change in the number of farms concluding plant species protection contracts and the average 
percentage change of compensation paid per farm, costs of N-surplus disposal, bought feed, area 
contracted and  fertiliser cost. 
 S1  S2  S3 
Revenue nature ( %) ∆    -92  0  -89 
Cost N surplus ( %) ∆    -60  54  -60 
Cost bought feed ( %) ∆    -20  +0  -2 
Area under contract ( %) ∆    -89  0  -89 
Cost  fertiliser use  0  89  23 
      
Number of farms concluding contracts ( ) N ∆       
•  High quality (22)  -22 0  -22 
•  Medium quality (78)  -74 0  -74 
•  Low quality (49)  -31 0  -31 
•  Total (99)  -77 0  -77 
 
 
Table 4 confirms that under S1 the amount of land contracted decreases if variable transaction 
costs increase. This decrease implies that more N can be applied on land because of the zero 
application norm for contracted land. This lowers the costs of N disposal or increases the revenue from 
applying manure from other farms on-farm. The larger production of feed on land not contracted 
lowers the amount of feed bought, and therefore, the costs of bought feed. Fertiliser use remains 
constant. This result is due to the fact that some farms do not use fertiliser on regularly used land. For 
these farms N from animal manure is sufficient to produce the feed required and extra revenue from 
selling feed does not outweigh fertiliser costs. A switch from contracted land to regularly used land 
does not lead to a change in fertiliser use for these farms. In the base run farms using fertiliser use 78 
kg N per hectare. In total 77 farms stop concluding plant species protection contracts. 
  In S2 more strict manure policies do not lead to less farms contracting land. The more strict 
application norms increase the N surplus, and therefore, N disposal cost. The decrease in N from 
manure availability makes it attractive to buy extra fertiliser to maintain feed production at the same 
level. Farms using fertiliser start using the maximum amount of 148 kg N per hectare. Given that the 
same amount of land is contracted the demand for bought feed remains equal. However the small 
decrease in total N use lowers feed production slightly, and therefore, leads to a small increase (0.3%) 
in feed bought.  
  Higher feed prices in S3 make it more attractive to produce feed on-farm. This leads to less 
land contracted. In total 77 farms stop concluding plant species protection contracts. Because less land 
is contracted more N can be applied on-farm because of the higher application standards for regularly used land. This decreases N disposal costs or increases revenue from applying manure from other 
farms on-farm. The decrease in land contracted leads to a decrease in the amount of feed bought. 
Fertiliser use goes up because it is more attractive to produce feed on farm. 
  In S4 we look at the possibility of lock-in. Initially 99 farms conclude plant species protection 
contracts. Suppose now that farms expect the compensation paid to remain unchanged. This implies 
that a price fall comes unexpected. If the compensation falls with 50% of the initial 99 farms 22 farms 
would still conclude a contract. Only 8 farms would contract the same amount of land. 77 farms would 
like to stop the contract. However, taking into account the switch costs in year 6 (the beginning of the 
second period of five years) of more than 1150 euro per hectare would imply that all farms that 
initially had a plant species protection contract will renew the contract although they would have not 
done this without the switch costs. So all farms are locked in when switch costs are higher than 1150 
euro per hectare. 
 
 
6  Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper presents a theoretical and empirical model that can be used to model plant species 
protection contract choice on farm level. The model assumes contract choice is strongly determined by 
the differences in N application and feed production between regularly and contracted land. The paper 
analyses the role of transaction costs and change in manure policies on contract choice and the 
possibility of lock-in situations. The model is applied on 151 farms taken from a sample drawn from a 
farm survey held in the Achterhoek a region in the Netherlands. 
Results show that higher transaction costs, more strict N application standards and higher feed 
prices lead to less land contracted. However, higher transaction costs and feed prices and manure 
policies do not automatically lead to less land contracted. For some farms this is the case but not for 
all. Moreover, the level of changes is relevant. This illustrates the importance of farm-specific models. 
Also the possibility of lock-in is illustrated. Given that the quality of land falls if plant species 
protection contracts are concluded extra costs have to be made to recover land quality (e.g. grassland 
renewal). This forces farms to renew contracts although the terms (e.g. compensation paid) of a 
contract are worsened. 
The analysis is subject to some qualifications. First, we use a linear programming model. So, 
there is no continuous adjustment but the outcomes ‘jump’ from one equilibrium to another. Given 
that we build models for a large number of farms makes the jumps for the average farm smaller but 
they are still present. The fact that we have a model with a small number of restrictions makes the 
reactions also less continuous. Second, the model does not calculate back the actual amount of land 
contracted. The reason for this could be that in reality there are different types of contracts that farms 
can conclude. Using PMP (Positive Mathematical Programming) the model could be ‘forced’ to 
calculate the actual amount of hectares contracted. In reality 39 out of the 151 farms conclude a plant 
species protection contract, in the model 99 out of 151 farms conclude a contract.  
Despite the qualifications the approach discussed is flexible because it makes it possible to 
introduce all kinds of technical and institutional restrictions (e.g. contract time), transaction costs and 
policies. Given farm-specific/contract-specific outcomes, the survey and model can help to better 
understand reasons why farms conclude a specific contract and what the consequences are for 
production, profit, etc. This information is relevant given the larger emphasis the EU is putting on 
quantifying the effects of agri-environmental policies.  
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Appendix 1: 
 
The yield of grass is expressed in tons dry matter (DM) cutP
-1
P. The energy value of forages is 
expressed as net energy for lactation (NEL, kJ kgP
-1
P DM).  Multiplying the DM yield haP
-1
P of each cut 
by the corresponding energy value per kg dry matter and adding up for all the cuts results in the 
annual energy yields. The use of N fertilizer is important in intensive grass-based dairy farming, as it 
affects dry matter yield and crude protein concentration in the herbage (Vellinga et al., 2004: 365). 





P). Several studies show the effects of N fertilization on forage production in dairy farming 
systems (e.g.  Middelkoop and Aarts (1992); Ven (1992); Valk et al. (2000); Berge et al. (2002); 
Nevens and Rehuel (2003); Trott et al. (2004); Vellinga et al. (2004). For this paper, the relation 
between N-application and NEL production per hectare per year is adapted from Ven (1992), 
Groeneveld et al. (1998), Groeneveld et al. (2001) and Nevens and Rehuel (2003)). Further, we 
assume that all farms apply grazing on their farm. Grazing is less efficient than mowing with equal 
amount of N-fertilization.  
 
The total supply of nitrogen (N) per year for grassland is calculated as follows: 
 
supply = manure + fertiliser + deposition + mineralisation   
 
With:  supply    =  supply  (N)   
manure     =  250 kg N/ha from animal manure   
fertiliser    =  endogenous but less than 148 kg N/ha, can be different for  
        good, medium and bad quality of grassland 
  deposition    =  assumption: 50 kg N/ha P 
  mineralization    =  assumption: 250 kg N/ ha 
 
For land contracted both N from manure and fertiliser are zero. 
Not all supplied nitrogen will be available for grass because of nitrogen leaching. From supply and 
leaching the available nitrogen can be derived (Bouman and Hermans, 1997): 
 
leaching = 15 + 0.32(supply-300)  
na = supply - leaching    
 
With leaching    =  leaching  N/ha 
 na      =  available  N/ha     
 
Only part of the nitrogen from the available nitrogen is taken up by the sward (see also Middelink and 
Aarts, 1991: 35-36; van der Ven, 1993: 23-26): 
 













With  nu    =  uptake  N/ha 
a α     =  constant  (1.14) 
b α     =  ratio  b α / c α  (= 1.176 × c α ) 
c α       =  horizontal asymptote that is 11.85% above maximum nitrogen 
uptake (=43.6×(1+0.1185)×maximum dry matter production) 
 
The maximum dry matter production is derived from the questionnaire and is based on subjective 
judgments of individual farmers. The actual dry matter production depends on the nitrogen uptake of 
grass (Middelink and Aarts, 1991:27-29 and Groeneveld et al., 1998: 29):   15
 













With dmB    
B=  dry matter yield per ha 
a β     =  constant  (19.88) 
b β     =  21.6  × c β  
c β     =  1.078  × maximum dry matter production 
 
The energy production (NEL) per kg dry matter is based on grazing (adapted from Groeneveld et al., 
1998: 35, Middelkoop and Aarts, 1991; and Ven, 1993 and Nevens and Rehuel, 2003): 
 
2
01 2 NEL nu nu γγ γ =+ +  
 
With  NEL      =  net energy for lactation (kJ per kg dry matter) 
0 γ     =  5947.932 
1 γ     =  15.0628 
2 γ     =  -0.020439 
 
The total dry matter production per ha per year (
i
r fz  and 
i
n fz ) is calculated by multiplying the NEL 
per kg dry matter with the total dry matter production per ha (so: dm ×NEL). Note that dry matter 
production per ha differs between good, medium and low quality grassland. 
 
 